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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Richard Healey was injured when he fell through
a floor opening of a construction project in Orem, Utah.

Healey

brought an action for personal injury against the general
contractor of the project, Appellant A.B.P. Enterprises, Inc.
("ABP"), the mechanical subcontractor, Appellee Clark Mechanical
Contractors, Inc. ("Clark") and a subcontractor of Clark,
Appellee J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc. ("JB"), in the Fourth Judicial
District Court ("District Court").

The claims of Healey were

settled, and this appeal concerns cross-claims which ABP filed
against Clark and JB seeking indemnification from Clark and JB
for ABP / s own negligence.
ABP moved for summary judgment for indemnity from Clark
alleging that specific language in the ABP Development Company
Contract ("Clark/ABP Agreement") provided indemnification to ABP
for ABP's own negligence.

ABP also moved for summary judgment

against JB pursuant to the Subcontract Agreement ("Clark/JB
Agreement") between Clark and JB.

Clark and JB both filed Cross-

Motions for Summary Judgment against ABP on the indemnity issues.
The District Court denied ABP's motions and granted Clark's and
JB's cross-motions.

ABP then initiated this appeal seeking a

reversal of the District Court's order.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues on appeal affecting Clark and the standards of
appellate review are as follows:
1.

Whether, the District Court correctly found that the

indemnity provisions of the Clark/ABP Agreement cannot reasonably
be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that Clark
indemnify ABP for ABP , s own negligence.
As the District Court ruled as a matter of law, the
proper standard of review is "correctness" giving no deference to
the District Court's view of the law.

Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt

v. Blomcmist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
2.

Whether, Clark is entitled to a judgment over against

JB pursuant to the indemnification language in the Clark/JB
Agreement, if this Court finds the District Court ruling to be
incorrect on the issues of indemnification.
The standard of review for this issue is also
"correctness".
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following statute is determinative in this appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1.

(The statute is set out in full in

Exhibit " A " ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
ABP seeks review of the District Court's denial of ABP's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for indemnity from Clark and

2

JB and from the District Courts Orders granting Clark/s and JB's
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment.

In the event that this Court

finds the Orders of the District Court to be incorrect, Clark
seeks a judgment over against JB pursuant to the Clark/JB
Agreement.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Richard Healey sued the Owner and General Contractor,
ABP, a subcontractor, Clark and a sub-subcontractor, JB in the
Fourth Judicial District Court for recovery for personal injuries
sustained from a fall while working at the Word Perfect
construction site.

(R. 101.)

Clark and JB for indemnity.

ABP filed a Cross-Claim against
(R. 1255).

Clark filed a Cross-

Claim against JB for indemnity. (R. 236).
ABP filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking indemnity
against Clark on November 12, 1992.

(R. 1053).

On December 21,

1992, Clark filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss
ABP's indemnification claims.

(R. 2123).

The District Court

issued a Memorandum Decision on February 10, 1993, (R. 1720 and
Exhibit "B") and in an Order dated March 9, 1993, the District
Court denied ABP's Motion and granted Clark's Cross-Motion
holding that the indemnify provisions of the contract between ABP
and Clark make reference to liability that may arise from Clark's
performance of the contract, but cannot reasonably be interpreted
as evidencing any intent of the parties that Clark indemnify ABP
for ABP's own negligence.

(R. 2058 and Exhibit " C " ) . The

District Court also stated that the contract's indemnity clause
3

makes reference to liability that may arise from Clark's
performance.

However, the District Court noted that their is no

similar reference to possible liability arising from ABP's
actions.

(R. 2058 and Exhibit " C " ) .
On November 24, 1992, ABP filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment seeking indemnity from JB based on the Clark/JB
Agreement.
Motion.

(R. 1186).

(R. 1272).

On December 18, 1992, JB filed its Cross-

In the Memorandum Decision dated February

10, 1993 (R. 1720) and in an Order and Judgment dated March 9,
1993 (R. 2058) the District Court denied ABP's Motion for Summary
Judgment against JB.

In a Memorandum Decision dated June 21,

1993 (R. 2143), and in an Order and Judgment dated September
13th, 1993, the District Court granted JB's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment against ABP.

(R. 2174).

After Clark learned of ABP's intent to appeal the
District Court's rulings on the indemnification issues, and in an
attempt to reach a final judgment, Clark moved the District Court
for a Judgment on Clark's Cross-Claim against JB.
2120).

(R. 2017 and

JB filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on Clark's

Cross-Claim on June 30th, 1993.

(R. 2146).

On October 4, 1993,

the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision (R. 2176) and on
October 18, 1993, the District Court signed an Order denying
Clark's motion for summary judgment and granting JB's CrossMotion.

(R. 2180).
On November 8, 1993, ABP filed a Notice of Appeal.

2187).

(R.

Attempting to secure a judgment over against JB if this
4

Court reversed the rulings of the District Court, Clark filed a
Notice of Cross Appeal on November 15, 1993,

(R. 2191).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The action in the District Court involved a fall at a
construction site at 1555 North Technology Way in Orem, Utah, on
March 7, 1991.

(R. 103). The plaintiff, Richard Healey, was

employed by Gene Peterson Concrete.

In the process of their

work, Healey and a co-employee moved a large section of heating
duct, exposing an opening in the floor.
opening sustaining personal injuries.

Healey fell through the
(R. 101).

Healey alleged in his Complaint that the opening in the
floor was cut by an employee of JB.

(R. 101). The hole was

covered with a large section of heating duct, by employees of
ABP.

Healey alleged that ABP, Clark, and JB were negligent in

failing to properly cover the opening and in failing to provide a
safe place to work.

(R. 100). The District Court did not

apportion fault among the parties because Healey's claims were
settled.
Clark was a subcontractor of ABP, engaged to coordinate
all labor and material to install the mechanical system at the
construction project.

(R. 664). JB was a subcontractor of Clark

engaged to provide all labor and material to install all duct
work for air distribution in the building being constructed.
(R. 664).
On September 17, 1990, ABP and Clark executed the
Clark/ABP Agreement.

(R. 631 and Exhibit " D " ) .
5

The Clark/ABP

Agreement was drafted by ABP, and had been used by ABP on all
buildings constructed at the Word Perfect site.

(R. 631). The

Clark/ABP Agreement contained indemnification language that
provided that Clark would indemnify and save ABP harmless from
and against any and all loss, damage, injury, liability, and
claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons, and all loss
of or damage to property of others, resulting directly or
indirectly from Clark's performance of the contract.

(R. 630).

On October 23, 1990, Clark and JB executed the Clark/JB
Agreement.

(R. 628 and Exhibit " E " ) .

The Clark/JB Agreement

provided that JB would assume toward Clark all the obligations
that Clark assumed toward ABP.

(R. 627). It also provided that

JB agreed to be bound by the provisions of the Clark/ABP
Agreement.

(R. 628).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

The strict construction rule relating to indemnity

agreements continues to be the law in Utah.

Under this rule,

there is a presumption against an intent to indemnify for an
indemnitee's own negligence unless that intention is clearly and
unequivocally expressed.
II.

The District Court was correct in holding that the

language of the Clark/ABP Agreement does not express any intent
to indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.

The District Court

correctly noted that the indemnification provision in question
makes reference to liability that may arise from Clark's
performance of the contract, however, their is not similar
6

reference to possible liability arising from the contractors
actions.
ABP's reliance on Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co. . 793
P.2d 362 (Utah 1990), to support its argument of indemnity is
misplaced.

The indemnification provision in the Clark/ABP

Agreement is not similar to the indemnification agreement in
Freund.

The facts and circumstances surrounding the Clark/ABP

Agreement do not evidence any intent by the parties that Clark
indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.

Moreover, there is no

evidence from other language in the Clark/ABP Agreement
suggesting that the parties intended that Clark indemnify ABP for
ABP's own negligence.
ABP's allegations that the key indemnification language
in Freund is similar to the key language in the Clark/ABP
Agreement is incorrect.

The Freund court found that several

provisions were "key" in supporting the court's finding of
indemnification.

Moreover, the Freund court focused upon the

"broad sweeping" language of the indemnification provision.

The

indemnification language found in the Clark/ABP Agreement is
substantially limited in comparison to the language in Freund.
The language in the Clark/ABP Agreement limits indemnification
solely to liability arising from Clark's performance of the
contract.
III.

The Utah comparative negligence law has no bearing

on the interpretation of the Clark/ABP Agreement.
raise this issue in the District Court.
7

ABP failed to

Consequently, matters

which are not a part of the record in the trial court cannot be
considered in connection with an appeal.
ABP cannot request that this Court rewrite the Clark/ABP
Agreement.

It is a basic rule of contract law that a court will

not make a better contract for the parties than they have made
for themselves.

Moreover, the Clark/ABP Agreement was drafted by

ABP and this Court should construe the contract against the
drafter.
The Utah comparative negligence law has no substantive
effect on the Clark/ABP Agreement.

Furthermore, the Agreement

has meaning, even in light of the comparative negligence law.
IV.
§ 13-8-1.

ABP's indemnity claims violate Utah Code Ann.
The Clark/ABP Agreement clearly involves the

construction industry.

Moreover, if one accepts ABP's

interpretation of the indemnification provision, Clark would be
required to indemnify ABP for ABP's sole negligence.

The

Clark/ABP Agreement contains no language excepting Clark for
indemnifying ABP in situations were liability results from ABP's
sole negligence.

This Court's recent decision in Jacobsen

Construction v. Blaine Construction, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah
App. 1993) is controlling.

Consequently, ABP's claims for

indemnification are against public policy, void and
unenforceable.
V.

If this court finds that Clark must indemnify ABP for

ABP's own negligence then Clark is entitled to a judgment over
against JB.

In the Clark/JB Agreement, JB assumed toward Clark
8

all the obligations and responsibilities that Clark assumed
toward ABP.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE STRICT CONSTRUCTION RULE OF INDEMNITY
AGREEMENTS IS APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE AND SHOULD
NOT BE RELAXED.

The Supreme Court of Utah in Freund v. Utah Power & Light
CO,, 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990), reiterated the well established
rule that "an indemnity agreement which purports to make a party
respond for the negligence of another should be strictly
construed."

Id, at 370,

Furthermore, the Court stated that "a

party is contractually obligated to assume ultimate financial
responsibility for the negligence of another only when that
intention is clearly and unequivocally expressed,"

Id, at 370,

Following the well-established law in Utah, the Utah
Supreme Court applied the strict construction rule in Freund,

Ir

the indemnification cases which have followed Freund, the Utah
Supreme Court and this Court have continued to apply the strict
construction rule to indemnification agreements which purport to
indemnify for one's own negligence.

Most recently, in Ericksen

v. Salt Lake City Corp,. 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993), the Utah
Supreme Court, applying the strict construction rule used by the
Court in Freund, affirmed the trial court's ruling that the
indemnification language of the contract did not clearly and
unequivocally express an intent by the parties to indemnify for
one party's own negligence and that the indemnitee's reliance on
Freund was misplaced.
9

Also, this Court in Gordon v. CRS Consulting Engineers.
Inc.. 820 P.2d 492 (Utah App. 1991), reiterated the
indemnification standards set by the Utah Supreme Court in
Freund.

This Court held that Utah Courts continue to apply the

rule of strict construction when confronted with an indemnity
agreement.l
There can be no doubt that the strict construction rule
relating to indemnification agreements, which purport to
indemnify a party for that party's own negligence, is still the
law in the State of Utah.

Despite ABP , s contentions, the strict

construction rule still serves a vital purpose, especially in the
construction industry where safety is such an important issue.
Any legal rule that discourages carelessness serves a purpose.
Liability insurance may shift the financial burden, as pointed
out by ABP, however, that reasoning is not comforting to an
employee who is injured as a result of carelessness on the part
of another.
Moreover, in the construction industry, general
contractors continue to enjoy greater bargaining power than the

Specifically this Court stated:
The Utah courts apply the rule of strict construction
when confronted with an indemnity agreement.
Pickover v. Smith Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664, 666
(Utah App. 1989). Under this rule, there is a
presumption against an intent to indemnify unless
that intention is clearly and unequivocally
expressed. Id. at 667 (quoting Union Pacific
Railroad v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah 2d
255, 408 P.2d 910, 913 (1956)).
10

subcontractors competing for work.

The strict construction rule

provides at least some protection to a subcontractor forced to
enter into a contract drafted by a general contractor.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE
LANGUAGE OF THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
CLARK AND ABP DOES NOT EXPRESS ANY INTENT THAT
CLARK INDEMNIFY ABP FOR ABP'S OWN NEGLIGENCE.

ABP maintains that Clark has contractually agreed to
indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.

ABP, in support of its

indemnification claim, relies upon specific language in the
Clark/ABP Agreement.2
is correct.

However, the finding of the District Court

The indemnity provisions relied upon by ABP cannot

reasonable be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties
that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.3

ABP cites

Freund. as sole support of its indemnification claim.

ABP's

2

The language in the contract relied on by ABP is as
follows:
(a) General Liability: Sub-Contractor [Clark] shall
indemnify and save General Contractor [ABP], its officers
or agents harmless from and against any and all loss,
damage, injury, liability, and claims thereof for
injuries to or death of persons, and all loss of or
damage to property of others, resulting directly or
indirectly from subcontractor's [Clark's] performance of
this contract. (Emphasis added).
3

The District Court in its Memorandum Decision stated:
Based upon its interpretation of the relevant
terms of the contract between ABP and Clark, the
Court finds that the indemnity provisions cannot
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent
of the parties that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's
own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause
clearly makes reference to liability that may
arise from the subcontractor's performance. Their
is no similar reference to possible liability
arising from the contractor's actions.
11

reliance on Freund is misplaced.
1. The Indemnification Provision in the Clark/ABP
Agreement is not similar to the indemnification
agreement in Freund.
ABP alleges that the indemnification provision in Freund
is very similar to the agreement currently before this Court.
truth, however, the two agreements are entirely different.

In

The

indemnification language in Freund was clearly broad sweeping.
The indemnification language provided for indemnification "from
any and all liability arising out of the attachment of cable
equipment to poles."4
The indemnification provision, which is the subject of
this appeal, limits Clark's duty of indemnification to injuries

4

The Utah Supreme Court in Freund referred to a portion of
the indemnification provision as follows:
The first sentence of that paragraph provides for
indemnity from "any and all" liability arising out
of the attachment of cable equipment to poles:
Licensee [Jones] shall indemnify, protect, and
save harmless Licensor [UP & L] from and
against any and all claims, demands, causes of
action, costs or other liabilities for damages
to property and injury or death to persons
which may arise out of or be connected with
the erection, maintenance, presence, use or
removal of Licensee's equipment, or of
structures, guys and anchors, used, installed
or placed for the principal purpose of
supporting Licensee's equipment or by any act
of Licensee on or in the vicinity of
Licensor's poles, including, but not by way of
limitation, payments made under workmen's
compensation laws.
12

resulting from Clark,s performance of the contract.5 The broad
sweeping language of the Freund provision did not limit the
indemnification to one parties performance.

Rather, the

indemnification related to any and all liability arising out of
the attachment of cable equipment to poles.
The express indemnification provision in the Clark/ABP
Agreement does not remotely compare to the Freund provision.
Rather, the Clark/ABP provision clearly expresses the intent of
the parties that Clark indemnify ABP only for losses arising out
of Clark's performance of the sub-contract agreement.
Consequently, there can be no question that the language relied
upon by ABP does not overcome the presumption against
indemnification for one's own negligence.

Furthermore, the

language in no way expresses a clear and unequivocal intent on
the part of Clark to indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.
2. The Facts and Circumstances in Freund are Very
Different From the Facts and Circumstances
Surrounding the Clark/ABP Agreement.
Despite ABP's contentions, the facts and circumstances
surrounding the Freund case are very different from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case at hand.

The facts and

5

Specifically the indemnification provision in the
Clark/ABP Agreement states:
Sub-contractor shall indemnify and save general
contractor, its officers or agents harmless from and
against any and all loss, damage, injury, liability, and
claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons, and
all loss of or damage to property or others, resulting
directly or indirectly from subcontractor's performance
of this contract. (Emphasis added).
13

circumstances in Freund clearly support an intent by the parties
of indemnification for the indemnitee's own negligence.

However,

the facts and circumstances surrounding the Clark/ABP Agreement
support no such contention.
In Freund, the plaintiff was injured when he came in
contact with an electrical power line as he was splicing
amplifiers into television cable previously hung on utility poles
owned by defendant, Utah Power & Light (UP&L).

UP&L granted

permission to the cable company to attach cables to UP&L's
existing utility poles provided the cable company would indemnify
UP & L from any and all liability relating to attaching the cable
to the Utility Poles.
UP&L granted permission to the cable company to use
UP&L's existing utility poles.

The poles had been in place for

many years and UP&L, although willing to allow use of the poles
by the cable company, was not willing to take responsibility for
the condition of the existing poles.
In the case at hand, Clark entered into a subcontract
agreement with ABP relating to the construction of an office
building on the Word Perfect compound.

Clark agreed to

coordinate all labor and material to install the mechanical
system at the construction site.
on the project.

ABP was the general contractor

The construction involved was new construction,

and Clark was engaged to perform a part of the new construction.
Freund, did not involve a construction contract as ABP
alleges.

UP & L had no involvement in the contract other than to
14

allow the cable company to use its existing poles•

ABP, on the

other hand, was the general contractor on the Work Perfect
building project and had primary responsibility for the
construction of the building.

Consequently, by the express

language of the agreement, Clark's duty to indemnify ABP related
only to liability arising from Clark's performance of the
contract.

Nothing in the facts or circumstances surrounding the

case at hand nor in the conduct of either Clark or ABP suggests
an intent that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.
3. There is No Evidence From Other Language in the
Clark/ABP Agreement of the Parties' Intent that Clark
Indemnify ABP for ABP's Own Negligence.
Unlike Freund. the Clark/ABP contract, when read as a
whole, does not provide any evidence supporting ABP's claim to
indemnification.

The contract in Freund, however, when taken as

a whole, contained numerous references indicating a clear intent
by the parties for the cable company to indemnify UP & L for UP &
L's own negligence.
For example, in Freund, the court looked to several
provisions in the contract for support of the parties' intent to
indemnify.

The court pointed out that the second sentence of the

indemnity provision, clearly and unequivocally provided that the
cable company's indemnity obligation extended to UP & L's actions
which may cause interruption with the cable company's service.
Further, the second sentence also provided an exception to
indemnification for UP&L's willful negligence or intentional
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wrongdoing.6
Additionally, the Freund court pointed to other language
in the contract in which the cable company agreed to indemnify
UP&L with "full and complete indemnification for all claims of
whatever nature," including" defense of any suits."7

The

Clark/ABP Agreement, when taken as a whole, does not express in
any way, let alone clearly and unequivocally, an intent by the
parties that Clark indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence.

ABP

is unable to point to any other language in the contract
supporting any suggestion on the part of the parties to indemnify
ABP for its own negligence.

6

Specifically the contract language cited by the court

states:
Except for intentional wrongdoing or willful negligence
on the part of licensor, or any of its agents or
employees, Licensee shall also indemnify, protect, and
save harmless Licensor from and against any and all
claims, demands, causes of action, costs, or other
liabilities arising from any interruption, discontinuance
or interference with licensee's service which may be
occasioned or which may be claimed to have been
occasioned by any action of Licensor pursuant to or
consistent with this agreement.
7

The third sentence states:
This indemnification agreement by Licensee in favor of
Licensor with full and complete indemnification,
including defense of any suits, actions or other legal
proceedings resulting from any claims for damages to
property and injury or death to persons and shall apply
to all claims, demands, suits, and judgments of whatever
nature which shall be made or assessed against Licensor
in furnishing such poles under the terms of this
agreement or for any other thing done or omitted in
conjunction with Licensor's dealings with Licensee.
16

4. The Key Language in Freund is Not Similar to the Key
Language in the Clark/ABP Agreement.
ABP would have this court believe that the key language
of the Clark/ABP Agreement is identical to the key language in
the Freund contract.

ABP focuses on the single word "liability"

contained in both indemnity provisions.
standing alone has no meaning.

The word "liability"

The word is given its meaning

when properly taken in context with the entire sentence.
As discussed above, the Freund court found that several
provisions were "key" in supporting the court's finding that the
intent of the parties was to indemnify UP & L for its own
negligence.

Furthermore, the "key" language in the Clark/ABP

contract is the language that ABP chooses to ignore.

Clark

agreed only to indemnify ABP for liability "resulting directly or
indirectly from Clark's performance of this contract."

As

indicated by the district court in its Memorandum Decision, this
"key" language clearly limits the scope of Clark's indemnity
obligations to ABP.

The district court stated, "Their is no

similar reference to possible liability arising from the
contractor's [ABP] actions."
III.

THE COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE LAW HAS NO BEARING ON
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT.

1. This Court Cannot Consider ABP's Argument In
Connection With This Appeal.
ABP argues, for the first time, that the comparative
negligence law requires that this court interpret the Clark/ABP
indemnification provision to provide for indemnification for

17

ABP's own negligence.

ABP basis its argument on the premise that

to interpret the indemnity provision any other way renders the
provision meaningless.
ABP's argument is without merit.

Moreover, ABP's

argument must fail because the argument was not raised in the
lower court.

The well-recognized rule of appellate review

provides that matters which are not a part of the record in the
trial court cannot be considered in connection with an appeal.
Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978).
2. The Clark/ABP Contract Should Not Be Construed To
Provide For Indemnity For ABP's Own Negligence.
ABP argues that this Court should evaluate the parties
intent in light of comparative negligence, which, according to
ABP, would require Clark to indemnify ABP for ABP's own
negligence.

ABP's argument must fail for several reasons.

First, the most basic law of contract construction is
that a court will not make a better contract for the parties than
they have made for themselves.8

ABP, contrary to this basic law

of contract construction is asking this court to, in effect,
rewrite the Clark/ABP contract to provide indemnification to ABP
for ABP's own negligence.
Second, the Clark/ABP contract was drafted by ABP.

It is

well-settled law in the State of Utah that a contract will be

8

See, Rio Alqom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd, 618 P.2d 497 (Utah

1980).
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construed against its drafter.9

ABP, as drafter of the contract

in question, had every opportunity to draft the contract in such
a way as to eliminate any controversy as to whether ABP would be
indemnified for its own negligence.

Rather, ABP chose to base

indemnification on Clark's performance of the contract, and made
no mention of indemnification for its own negligence.
Consequently, the contract must be construed against ABP and in
favor of Clark.
Third, ABP's reliance on the Utah comparative negligence
law to provide meaning to the indemnification provision in
question is erroneous.

As discussed above, the indemnification

language in question does not meet the requirements of the strict
construction rule.

Nothing in the facts and circumstances of

this case and nothing in the Clark/ABP Agreement evidences any
intent on the part of either party to require Clark to indemnify
ABP for ABP's own negligence.

ABP is simply attempting to use

the Utah comparative negligence law by masquerading the law as
having some kind of substantive effect on indemnification
agreements.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

In support of its argument ABP cites Washington National
Insurance Co. v. Sherwood A s s o c . 795 P.2d 665 (Utah. App. 1990).
However, the Washington National case has no relevance to the

9

See, Parks Enterprises v. New Century Realty, 652 P.2d
918 (Utah 1982); See also Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107
(Utah 1982) (in which the Supreme Court of Utah held that any
uncertainty with respect to construction of a contract should be
resolved against the party who has drafted the agreement).
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case at hand.

In Washington National, the law at issue related

to curing a defect in a judicial foreclosure action.

The law had

a substantive effect on the case and controlled the outcome.

In

the case at hand, the comparative negligence law has no
substantive or legal effect on the contracting parties rights
under the contract.
Moreover, the indemnification language in the Clark/ABP
Agreement has meaning despite the comparative negligence law.
There can be no question that the language of the indemnification
agreement would require Clark to indemnify ABP for any liability
imposed upon ABP as a result of Clark's non-performance of the
contract.

For example, if a subcontractor of Clark performed

substandard work, and Clark refused to remedy the work, ABP could
certainly remedy the work and then seek indemnification from
Clark pursuant to the indemnification language of the Clark/ABP
Agreement.
IV.

ABP'S INDEMNITY CLAIMS VIOLATE UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 13-8-1.

Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 provides that a contract to
construct a building containing an indemnity provision purporting
to indemnify the promisee against liability resulting from the
sole negligence of the promisee is against public policy and is
void and unenforceable.10
10

ABP's indemnity claims are void and

Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 in pertinent part provides:
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in,
or in connection with or collateral to, a contract or
agreement relative to the construction, alteration,
20

unenforceable as provide in Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1.

ABP argues

that the indemnification agreement in question does not purport
to indemnify ABP for its sole negligence.

However, ABP , s own

argument for indemnification is the basis for the applicability
of § 13-8-1.
If this Court were to accept ABP's argument for
indemnification, the indemnification agreement would be void.
The interpretation that ABP has placed upon the language of the
Clark/ABP Agreement could result in Clark indemnifying ABP for
ABP's sole negligence.

ABP argues that "the ABP Agreement also

indemnifies ABP against "liabilities" and therefore, as in
Freund, the ABP Agreement covers those situations where ABP is
liable, including liability for its own negligence."

See Brief

of Appellant p. 13.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the language of the
indemnification clause in the Clark/ABP Agreement excepting Clark
from indemnifying ABP for ABP's sole negligence.

Consequently,

ABP's claim for indemnification is against public policy and is
void and unenforceable pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1.
The United States District Court for the District of Utah

repair or maintenance of a building. . . , purporting to
indemnify the promisee against liability for damages
arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to
property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence
of the promisee . . . , is against public policy and is
void and unenforceable.
21

addressed the applicability of Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 in a
case11 involving an indemnification clause similar to the one at
hand.12

The Wollam court first addressed whether the language of

the contract clearly and unequivocally expressed the intent of
the parties to indemnify the indemnitee for the indemnitee's own
negligence.

The Federal Court, relying upon the Utah Supreme

Court decision of Union Pacific Railroad v. El Paso, 408 P.2d 910
(Utah 1965) held that the language of the contract did not
express a clear and unequivocal intent to indemnify the
indemnitee for the indemnitee7s own negligence.
Furthermore, the court, addressing the issue of whether
the indemnification language was void and unenforceable pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1, held that because the indemnification
provision failed to limit the indemnification obligation to
situations where the indemnitee was not the sole responsible
party, the provision was against public policy and void.13
11

See Wollam v. Kennecott Corp., 663 F.Supp. 268 (Dist.Utah

1987) .
12

The indemnification clause in the Wollam case states:
Seller hereby assumes the risk of any and all
accidental or negligent injuries or death, occasioned by
anything occurring in or about the execution and
performance of this purchase order or the doing of any
and all work thereunder, and hereby releases the
purchaser of and from any and all actions and claims on
account thereof.

13

Specifically the Court stated:
In addition, paragraph 8 fails to state that
Stockmar will not indemnify Kennecott if Kennecott is the
sole cause of an injury or damage. Thus, if the general
22

Clearly, the indemnification language of the Clark/ABP contract
fails to state that Clark will not indemnify ABP if ABP is the
sole cause of an injury.

Thus, if the general indemnification

language is read, as ABP argues it should be read, then it
provides for indemnification for ABP's own negligence, including
instances where the injury resulted from ABP's sole negligence.
ABP argues that this Court's recent decision in Jacobsen
Construction v. Blaine Construction, 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah
App. 1993) is distinguishable from this case.

In truth, however,

the Jacobsen Construction case is controlling.

In Jacobsen this

court was faced with a fact situation on point with the fact
situation of this case.

Both cases involve injuries to

employee's of concrete subcontractors who were injured by falling
through holes in the floors during the construction of large
buildings.

Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 is more easily applied to the

indemnification provision in the Clark/ABP contract than the
indemnification provision in Jacobsen.
In Jacobsen, the indemnification provision in question
contained an exception from indemnification for the sole active
negligence of the indemnitee.14

Nevertheless, this Court held

language is read to provide indemnification for
Kennecott's own negligence, it fails to limit that
obligation to situations where Kennecott is not the sole
responsible party. In those circumstances, such an all
encompassing indemnification provision is against public
policy is void and unenforceable.
14

The indemnity provision provides as follows:
Subcontractor shall indemnify contractor and/or
23

that because there was no exception for indemnification if the
indemnitee were solely and passively negligent the
indemnification agreement was void and unenforceable.15

In the

Clark/ABP contract there is no exception from indemnification
when injury results from ABP's sole negligence whether passive or
active.

Furthermore, an acceptance of ABP's interpretation of

the indemnification provision, would include indemnification for
situations where injury resulted from the sole negligence of ABP.
Clearly, Jacobsen is controlling and ABP's interpretation of the
indemnification language renders the indemnification language
void and unenforceable as against public policy, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 13-8-1.
V.

IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT CLARK MUST INDEMNIFY ABP
FOR ABP'S OWN NEGLIGENCE THEN CLARK IS ENTITLED TO
A JUDGMENT OVER AGAINST JB SHEET METAL.

The Clark/JB Agreement provides that JB assumes toward
Clark all the obligations and responsibilities that Clark assumed

owner against, and save each harmless from:
(2) any and all loss, damage, injury, liability and
claims thereof for injuries to or death to persons and
loss of or damages to property resulting directly or
indirectly from subcontractor's performance of this
agreement, regardless of the negligence of owner, the
contractor, or their agents or employees; provided that
where such loss, damage, injury, liability or claims are
the result of active negligence on the part of owner or
contractor or their respective agents or employees, and
is not caused or contributed to by an omission to perform
some duty also imposed on subcontractor, its agents or
employees, such indemnity shall not apply to such party
guilty of such active negligence unless the prime
contract otherwise provides.
15

Id. at 21.
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toward ABP.16

Further, JB agreed to be bound by the terms of the

prime contract (Clark/ABP Agreement).

Consequently, if Clark is

obligated to indemnify ABP for ABP's own negligence, then JB has
agreed to assume that same obligation toward Clark.

Clark would

be entitled to a judgment over against JB for any indemnification
obligation assessed against Clark.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Clark respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the ruling of the District Court.

This

Court should also rule that the indemnity provision is void under
Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1.

In the event this court reverses the

ruling of the district court, then Clark is entitled to a
judgment over against JB.
DATED this

/ H^

day of March, 1994.
STRONG/&/HANNI

Glenn C. Hanni
H. Burt Ringwood
Attorneys for Appellee
Clark Mechanical
Contractors, Inc.

16

The specific language of the Clark/JB Agreement reads:
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all
the obligations and responsibilities that the Contractor
assumes toward the Owner. The Subcontractor shall
indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against, and save
them harmless from, any and all loss, damage, expense,
costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on
account of any breach of the provisions or covenants of
this contract.
25

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

of March, 1994,

two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee,
Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc. were mailed, first class
postage prepaid, to:
Paul S. Felt
Mark M. Bettilyon
George S. Adondakis
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84045-0385
Attorneys for Appellant
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC.
Robert R. Wallace
John N. Braithwaite
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Attorneys for Appellee
J.B. Sheet Metal, Inc.
STRONG

5lenn C. Hanni
H. B u r t Ringwood
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13-8-1. Construction industry — Agreements to indemnify.
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in connection with
or collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of a building, structure, highway, appurtenance
and appliance, including moving, demolition and excavating connected therewith, purporting to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or
indemnitee, is against public policy and is void and unenforceable.
This act will not be construed to affect or impair the obligations of contracts
or agreements, which are in existence at the time the act becomes effective.
History: L. 1969, ch. 35, § 1.
Meaning of "this act." — The term "this
act" refers to Laws 1969, ch. 35, which enacted
this section.

Compiler's Notes. — The term "the time
the act becomes effective" refers to the effective
date of Laws 1969, ch. 35, which was May 13,
1969.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD HEALEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
CASE NUMBER: 910400292 PI
A.B.P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Third-Party
Plaintiff
vs.
GENE PETERSON dba GENE
PETERSON CONCRETE
Third-Party
Defendant

The Court has received and fully considered the following motions now pending in
this case:
1.

A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of

1720
EXHIBIT

"B"

4.
5.

Indemnity Against Clark Mechanical Contractors Inc.
Clark Mechanical's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgement.
A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement on Issue of
Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal.
J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement.
A.B.P. Enterprise's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement Against Plaintiff.

6.

Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing.

2
3.

The Court hereby denies the first motion enumerated above and accordingly grants
Clark Mechanical's cross-motion on the issue of indemnity. Based upon its inteipretation of
the relevant terns of the contract between A.B.P. and Clark, the Court finds that the
indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence. The contract's indemnity clause
clearly makes reference to liability that may arise from the subcontractor's performance.
Their is no similar reference to possible liability arising from the contractor's actions.
The Court would be inclined to deny the third motion enumerated above on similar
grounds, based upon the contractual language at issue. However, no contractual privity
exists between A.B.P. and J.B. Sheet Metal; and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement between Clark and J. B. Sheet
Metal. Hence, the motion must be denied in any event.
With regard to the fourth and fifth motions enumerated above, the Court grants the
motions in part and denies them in part. Consistent with the Court' s prior ruling on Clark's
motion for summary judgement, the court rules that plaintiffs "Fifth Cause of Action" is
invalid to the extent that it is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract
between A.B.P. Enterprises and Clark Mechanical or the contract between Clark Mechanical
and J.B. Sheet Metal. Based upon its interpretation of the contracts, the Court rules as a
matter of law that plaintiff was not an intended third-party beneficiary of such contracts. See
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Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzeerald, 626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981); and Ron Case Roofing A
Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). Although the contracts provide generally
for the implementation of safety measures, the terms of the contracts cannot reasonably be
interpreted as evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the plaintiff in this case.
Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the parties' contractual obligations of safety would
clearly have been incidental.
The Court farther grants defendants' motions for summary judgement against plaintiff
to the extent that plaintiff may be attempting to assert his second and third claims (involving,
alleged OSHA violations) as independent causes of action. The Court must agree with
defendants that no independent action exists for the breach of OSHA standards.
However, the Court denies the fourth and fifth motion enumerated above to the extent
that defendant's seek to have plaintiffs second and third claims dismissed.

In order to

avoid procedural or formal difficulties that may arise, the Court will not dismiss plaintiffs
second and third causes of action. The Court notes that while OSHA violations may not be
the basis for an independent cause of action, evidence of such violations may be permitted as
evidence of negligence (i.e. evidence of the relevant standard of care and the possible breach
thereof). Accordingly, plaintiffs second and third causes are not to be regarded as alternate
causes of action but rather alternate bases upon which negligence may be found.
The Court is inclined to grant defendants' motions for summary judgement with
regard to plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action on the basis that the facts involved in this case
doe not appear to be legally sufficient to support plaintiffs claim of an "inherently dangerous
condition." However, the Court will reserve its ruling on this issue until all the evidence has
been introduced at trial.
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Finally, finding no need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed of
in its prior ruling in this case, the Court hereby denies Plaintiffs Motion for Rehearing, filed
January 22, 1993.
Counsel for defendant J.B. Sheet Metal is to prepare an order within 15 days of this
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 10th day of February, 1993.

%

cc:

Brent D. Young, Esq.
Edward P. Moriarity, Esq.
Lynn C. Harris, Esq.
Raymond M. Berry, Esq.
Mark Dal ton Dunn, Esq.
Glenn C. Hanoi, Esq.
John N. Braithwaite, Esq.
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fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County. Stale of Utah
CAfifclA BTSMlW Cler?
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Robert R. Wallace, #3366
John N. Braithwaite, #4544
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C.
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
Telephone: (801) 363-7611
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
UTAH COUNTY, S^ATE OF UTAH
RICHARD HEALEY,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
J.B. SHEET METAL, INC., a
Utah corporation, and A.B.P.
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah
corporation, dba ABP DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, and CLARK MECHANICAL
CONTRACTORS, INC.,
Defendants.

A. B. P. ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah Corporation, dba ABP
Development Company,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs
GENE PETERSON, dba Gene
Peterson Concrete,
Civil No. 910400292PI
Third-Party
Defendant.

Judge Harding

The following motions have been received and have been
submitted for decision by the Court in this action:
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A.B.P. Enterprises7

1.
Judgment

on

Issue

of

Indemnity

Motion

for

Against

Partial
Clark

Summary

Mechanical

Contractors, Inc•;
2.

Clark

Mechanical's

Cross-Motion

for

Summary

Judgement;
3.

A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal;
4.

J.B.

Sheet

Metal's

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

5.

A.B.P. Enterprises' Motion

for

Partial

Summary

Judgment;

Judgment Against Plaintiff; and
6.

Plaintiff's Motion for Rehearing.

The

Court,

having

reviewed

each

of

the

foregoing

motions, the memoranda filed in support thereof and in opposition
thereto by the parties, having reviewed the relevant law, being
fully advised in the premises, and finding good cause therefor,
HEREBY ORDERS that A.B.P. Enterprises' ("A.B.P.") Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against Clark
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. ("Clark") is denied, and Clark's
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on A.B.P*'s claim for indemnity
is granted.

The Court finds that the indemnity provisions of the

contract between A.B.P. and Clark make reference to liability that
may arise from Clark's performance of the contract, but cannot
reasonably be interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties
that Clark indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence.
9.) r
_2—

)
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on Issue of Indemnity Against J.B. Sheet Metal is
denied.

There is no contractual privity between A.B.P. and J.B.

Sheet Metal, and A.B.P. has failed to establish that it is an
intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity provisions cf
the contract between Clark and J.B. Sheet Metal.

The Court

further finds that the indemnity provisions cannot reasonably be
interpreted as evidencing any intent of the parties that J.B.
Sheet Metal indemnify A.B.P. for A.B.P.'s own negligence.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that J.B. Sheet Metal's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and A.B.P.'s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Against Plaintiff are granted in part and denied in part
as follows:
1.

Consistent with the Court's prior ruling on

Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment/ summary judgment is granted
in favor of J.B. Sheet Metal and A.B.P. and against plaintiff on
plaintiff's

Fifth

Cause

of

Action.

The

Court

rules

that

plaintiff's Fifth Cause of Action is invalid to the extent that it
is based on either implied or express provisions of the contract
between A.B.P. and Clark or the contract between Clark and J.B.
Sheet Metal.

The plaintiff was not an intended

beneficiary of either of the contracts.

third-party

Although the contracts

provide generally for the implementation of safety measures, the
terms

of

the

contracts

cannot

reasonably

be

interpreted

as

evidencing the intent of the parties to directly benefit the
-3EXHIBIT "

plaintiff.

Any benefit enjoyed by the plaintiff due to the

contractual obligations of the parties would clearly have been
incidental.
2.

The Court further grants summary judgment in favor

of all the defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff's Second
and Third Causes of Action to the extent that the plaintiff
alleges the Second and Third Causes of Action as independent
causes of action.
exists

The Court finds that no independent action

for the breach of OSHA standards.

Evidence of OSHA

violations may not be the basis of an independent cause of action,
but may be permitted only as evidence of negligence. However, the
Court does not dismiss plaintiff's Second and Third Causes of
Action.

They are not alternate causes of action, but rather

alternate bases upon which negligence may be found.
3.

With regard to all the motions for summary judgment

on p l a i n t i f f s Fourth Cause of Action, the Court finds that the
facts

involved

in

this

action

do

not

appear

to

be

legally

sufficient to support plaintiff's claim of an inherently dangerous
condition.

However, the Court reserves its ruling on this issue

until all of the evidence has been introduced at trial.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED

that

plaintiff's

Rehearing, filed January 22, 1993, is denied.

Motion

for

The Court finds no

need or justification for reconsideration of the issues disposed
of in its prior ruling.

c' vj 0 D
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DATED this

7

day of y V % £ ^ ^ £

, 1992C?

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

RAYMOND M. BERRY
Attorney for A.B.P.
Enterprises

GLENN C. HANN#
Attorney for Clark
Mechanical

LYNN C. HARRIS
Attorney for plaintiff
Richard HeaJ

MARK DALTON DUNN
Attorney for Gene
Peterson Concrete

Attorney for J,B.
Sheet Metal
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ABP

DEVELOPMENT

COMPANY

CONTRACT
THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 11th day of September, 1990, by and
between ABP Enterprises, Inc., dba ADP Development Company, of Orem, Utah, hereinafter referred
to as General Contractor, and CLARK MECHANICAL, of Provo, Utah, hereinafter referred to as
Sub-Contractor.
A. SPECIAL TERMS:
1. Job Description: #910, Building KL
2. The Sub-Contractor shall perform for the General Contractor at or near 1359 N. Res. Way,
Orem, Utah, the hereinafter described work, and under the conditions and terms contained herein.
3.
Work shall be commenced September 1, 1990, diligently prosecuted, and completed by
Februaiy 1, 1991.
4.
General Contractor shall pay Sub-Contiactor, in accordance with statements prepared by the
Sub-Contractor, a compensation of ($ 930,409.00), as specified under 2D (1) and (2).

B. GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1. PERFORMANCE OF THE WORK
( a ) S p e c i f i c a t i o n s a n d S t a n d a r d s : Subcontractor shall perform the work in accordance with (1) the
plans and specifications and exhibits, if any, for said job, and
(2) according to oil standards prescribed by law or by anylxidy
having the right to prescribe minimum standards.
( b ) P e r m i t s : Unless otherwise provided herein, SubContractor shall, at Sub-Contractor's sole cost and expense,
seen i t all necessary permits, make all cash or other deposits,
furnish all bonds, and give all notices required by law.

(c.) Materials, Equipment, Labor: Unless
otherwise provided herein, Sub-Contractor shall furnish all
material, utilities, supplies, tools, and equipment, and perform
all labor.
( d ) S a f e t y M e a s u r e s : Sub-Contractor shall take all
reasonable precautions to protect the work, workmen, and the
public; and shall provide, where reasonably necessary, barriers,
guards temporary bridges, lights, and watchmen.
( e ) Please see attached Exhibit "A* for specifications.
2.

COMPENSATION

( a ) E x t r a W o r k : Sub-Contractor shall be entitled to
payment for extra work performed only if such work shall
have been previously authorized in writing by the General
Contractor.
( b ) T a x e s : The compensations provided herein includes
and Sub-Contractor shall pay all State and Federal payroll
taxes, including contributions or taxes assessed against
employees on wages earned, in connection with the work.
Sub-Contractor agrees to indemnify Genera! Contractor for all
liability in connections therewith and to make all reports
required thereunder. The compensation ulso includes an
amount on account of all other taxes now or hereafter
imposed by am governmental authority upon, measured hy or
incident to, i|.*» performance of this contract or the purchase,
storage, use oi consumption by the Sub-Contractor of material
us«*d in the performance of this contract.
<C) A c c e p t a n c e o f W o r k : Acceptance shall boon the

date the work is completed to the General Contractor's
satisfactions. No payment hereunder shall constitute an
acceptance of defective work or improper materials.

(d) Terms of Payment: (l) At the end of each
calendar month during the progress of the work, and upon
completion of the en tire work, Sub-Contractor shall be entitled
to receive eighty-five percent (85%) of the compensation
provided herein for the work performed during that month.
The balance shall be payable 35 days after acceptance, provided
there arc no undischarged or unsecured liens, attachments, or
claims in connection with the work. General Contractor may
require, as a condition to payment, that Sub-Contractor
submit evidence, by receipted bills or otherwise, that all costs
incurred for the work have been paid. (2) When payments arc
due as provided above, Sub-Contractor shall prepare
statements of amounts payable. Such statements shall show
Uic total compensation for the work performed to date, less
any previous payments.

3- DELAYS
The time for completion shall be extended for such period
that the Sub-Contractor is delayed by acts of God or the
elements, or by other causes beyond Sub-Contractor's
reasonable control, including civil disorders and labor
disturbances.

4.INSPECTIONAPPROVAUCANCELLATION
( a ) I n s p e c t i o n s : General Contractor shall have the
right to visit and inspect the work, or any part thereof, at all
times. Sub-Contractor shall keep a competent man in the
immediate vicinity of the work to receive communications
from General Contractor and to supervise the work.
(b)
A p p r o v a l : General Contractor may reject
materials, whether worked or unworked, and all portions of
the work which appear to be unsound or defective or failing in
any way to conform with the specifications hereof; SubContractor shall remove such rejected materials or portions of
the work from the premises within twenty-four (21) hours
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flftcr receiving notice thereof from Gctirral Omtractor. If
removal of rejected materials or work should result in damage
In materials furnished Uy Gcnenil Contractor. Sub-Contractor
shall furnish new materials of identical kind and quantity
without cost to General Contractor.
<C) C a n c e l l a t i o n : (1) Should Sub-Contractor fail,
refuse, or neglect to supply sufficient material to be supplied
by Sub-Contractor hereunder; or tools, labor, or properly
skilled workmen to complete the work hereunder with
reasonable diligence and dispatch, for three (3) days after
written notice of such default to Sub-Contractor, the General
Contractor may at any time thereafter take over and complete
the work. The cost to the General Contractor of completing
such work shall be deducted from any moneys due SubContractor. If such cost exceeds any such moneys, SubContractor shall reimburse the General Contractor. (2)
Should the Sub-Contractor seek relief under any law for the
benefit of insolvents, or be adjudged as bankrupt, the General
Contractor may at any time thereafter terminate this
agreement and complete the work as provided in Section 4(C)(
f
> hereof, except that any payments due from Sub-Contractor
to vendors for material supplied for work hereunder may be
made direct by the General Contractor to such vendors, and be
deducted from the amounts otherwise due to the SubContractor. (3) General Contractor may, at his absolute
discretion, stop the work at any time, hut where Subcontractor is not in default hereunder. General Contractor
shall pay Sub-Con tractor for nil work done in conformity with
the plans and specifications.

5. LIABILITY
(a)
General
L i a b i l i t y : Sub-Contractor shall
indemnify and save General Contractor, its officers or agents
harmless from and against any and all loss, damage, injury,
liability, and claims thereof for injuries to or death of persons,
and all loss of or damage to property of others, resulting directly or indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this
contract
( b ) L i a b i l i t y f o r E x i s t i n g P r o p e r t y : Subcontractor shall be liable to General Contractor for any loss
of or damage to existing property resulting directly or
indirectly from Sub-Contractor's performance of this contract
to the extent of the applicable insurance which Sub-Contractor
has in force at the time of the occurrence and which shall not
be less than the amount provided in Section G hereof.

(c) Liability for the Work Hereunder: SubContractor shall exercise due care and diligence in the conduct
of the work hereunder and in the care and protection of any
material or equipment furnished by General Contractor to
Sub-Contractor therefor. Such work, material, or equipment
lost or damaged by fire, storm, or any other cause whatsoever,
Sub-Contractor shall reconstruct, repair or replace.

(d) Employer's Liability: Sub-Contractor shall
perform the work hereunder in conformance with all
applicable Federal and Stntc labor laws, and shull indemnify
and save General Contractor harmless from any and all
liability, claims, costs, and expenses of whatsoever nature
under such laws arising out of the performance of this
contract.
( e ) L i e n s : Sub-Contractor shall discharge at once or
shall bond against all liens which may be filed in connection
with the work performed by Sub-Contractor, ond shall save
the General Contractor and the owners of the premises upon
which the work is performed harmless therefrom.

( 0 A t t o r n e y ' s F e e s : Sub-Contmctor shall pay („
General Contractor a reasonable attorney fee, in any Icjjai
nction in which the General Contractor prevails, brought
against Sub-Con tractor based on a breach of this contract

6- INSURANCE
Sub-Con tractor shall maintain at all times during thc
performance of work hereunder the following insurance in
companies and on terms satisfactory to General Contractor:
(1) Workmen's Compensation Insurance, as prescribed or
permitted by law. (2) Property Damage, Liability Insurance,
including automobile, covering property of others and property
of General Contractor other than the work performed under
this contract, in an amount not less that $1,000,000.00 for
each occurrence.

7. ASSIGNMENT
( a ) A s s i g n m e n t : This agreement shall not be
assigned, sublet, or transferred in whole or in part by the SubContractor, except with the previous written consent of the
General Contractor.

(b) Assignment by General Contractor, it
is expressly agreed that General Contractor may assign all of
its rights and interest hereunder to the owner, and that in
such event, Sub-Contractor shall continue in its performance
hereunder as if no assignment had been made.

8- CONTRACTOR'S UNDERSTANDING
It is undervood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor, as the
result of careful examination, is satisfied as to the nature and
location of the work, the conformation and structure of the
ground, the character, quality, and quantity of the materials
(., «.c used, the character of equipment and facilities needed
prohminary to and during the prosecution of the work, the
general and local conditions, and all other matters which can
in any way afTcct the work under this contract
No
representations by or oral agreement with any officer, agent,
or employee of the General Contractor, either before or after
the execution of this contract, shall affect or modify any of the
Sub-Contractor's rights or obligations hereunder.
It is further understood and agreed that the Sub-Contractor
is bound and will comply with ail the terms and conditions of
the labor agreements to which the General Contractor is a
party, insofar as said labor agreements lawfully require the
Sub-Contractor to be so bound.

SUB-CONT^A^^f^,
By:

c£r>^CsC~*~*{

—

GENERAL CONTRACTOR:
ABP DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

By: /pU*
coi:

^A^M^^-

' • ' • } • • •
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DEC c s 9
i 9o SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT
_

Provo

3

THIS AGREEMENT made at

.

October
_f

^lfi 90

P r o v o , Utah

23rd
_

hy

_ , Utah, this

^u.i-~~

_

day of

Clark Mechanical Contractors/ Inc.

^ kcrelnafier referred to a* the Contractor, .nd

J«B. Sheet

Metal/ Inc.
2487 South 3270 West West Valley City, Utah 84119
hereinafter rehired to ai the Subcontractor. We bind ourselves, our heirs, executory administrators, antecessors, mud assigns
Jointly and aetcraUy firmly by these presents.
WITNESSETH: That for and in consideration o f the covenants herein contained, the Contractor and iht Subcontractor
afree ax folJowx:
1.

SCOPE OF WORK
That the worl to be performed by the Subcontractor tinder the terms of this agreement consists of the foliofrinx;:
Furnkhbi of all labor and material, tools, implements, and equipment, acaffoldinf, permits, fees, e t c , to d o all of the

follow-in*: Bldg. #9 Specs to apply/ 15000 General/ 15030 System commissioning/ 15042
Testing/ 15043 Balancing/ (Including I.D* and O&M)/ 15050 Basic Materials and
Methods/ 15180 Insulation (DucLvrap and breaching)/ 15800 Air distribution.
Total price (Including tax addenda, and alternate)..•..

$297/903.00

When the Subcontractor dots cot install aU material furnished ender this Subcontract auch material as Is c o t installed
k to be delivered F/>.B

<T

(A
U^

Orem J o b s i t e

.

fe strict accordance with the plans and ape ail cations as prtptied

u*
^

by .

Brower & Associates

WordPerfect Bldg. #10

^XrchiUcl and/or Engineer, for the construction o f .

0^

Tor WordPerfect Corp.

ChrDCTt

for which constructioD the Contractor has the prime contract with the Owner; together with aU addenda or authorized
changes issued prior to the dale of execution of this agreement.
The Contractor and the Subcontractor atjree to be bound by iht ternis of iht prime contract agreement, construction
regulations, general conditions, plans and apecifications, and any and all other contract documents, If any there be, insofar
as applicable to this subcontract agreement, and to that portion of iht wori herein describe^ to be performed by the Subcontractor.
In thf event of any doubt or question arising between thf Contractor and the Subcontractor with ttipeci to the plans
and specification/ the decision of iht Architect and/or Enfineei shall b< conclusive and binding Should there be nosupertbiof, architect orer th< **orl, then the matter in question shell b< determined ai provided in Section 7 of the agreement.
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prorreis of the entire comirucuon, «iu »u«i« ww. *v — • / «* V W C ^ J K , . . ^
- ..-.-^vi
or any other Subcontractor, and in the event that the Subcontractor ©ejects and/or fails to supply the necenary fcbor
and/or materials tools. Implement*, equipment, etc.. In the opinion of the Contractor, then the Contractor ah.11 notify the
Subcontractor In writing setting forth the deficiency and/or delinquency, and five days after date of inch written notice, the
Contractor ahall ba%e the rifhl If be ao dcxire* to take over the work of the Subcontractor in full, and exclude the Subcontractor from any further participation in the work covered by this agreement; or, at bis option the Contractor may take
over auch portion of the Subcontractor'a work an the Contractor ahall deem to be in the best interest of the Contractor, and
permit the Subcontractor to continue with the remaining portion* of the work. WbicheTer method the Contractor mifht elect
to pursue the Subcontractor a^reex to release to the Contractor, for bit w e only, without recount, any materials, t o o k .
ImplemenU equipment, etc.. on tht aite, b e l o n g to or in the possession of the Subcontractor, for the benefit of the Contractor in wmpJclinf the work covered in this agreement; and, the Contractor agree* to complete the work to the beat of
his abiHty and in the most economical manner available to him at the time. Any costs incurred by the Contractor in doing
any auch portion of the work covered by this agreement «hall be charged against any monies due or to become due under the
terms of this arreement, mnd in the event the total amount due or to become due under the terms of this agreement shall be
Insufficient to cover the* costs accrued by the Contractor in completing the work, then the Subcontractor and his sureties, if
any. ahall be bound and liable unto the Contractor for the difference.
Should the proper workmanlike and accurate performance of any work coder this contract depend wholly or partially
upon the proper workmanlike or accurate performance of any work or materials furnished by the Contractor or other subcontractors on the project, the Subcontractor agrees to use all means necessary to discover any such defects and report same in
writinr to the Contractor before proceeding with his work which is so dependent; and shall allow to the Contractor a reasonable time In which to remedy auch defects; and in the event he does not ao report to the Contractor fa writing, then it ahalJ
be assumed that the Subcontractor has fully accepted the work of others as being satisfactory and he ahall be fully responsible thereafter for the satisfactory performance of the work covered by this agreement, regardless of the defective work of
others.
The Subcontractor shall clean up and remove from the site as directed by the Contractor, all rubbish and debris resulting from his work Failure to clean up rubbish and debris shall terve as cause for withholding further payment to Subcontractor until such time as this condition is corrected to the satisfaction of the Contractor. Also he shall clean up to the
•atisfaclion of the inspectors, all dirt, frease marks, e t c , from walls, ceiling floors fatum.ctc^ deposited or placed thereon
as a result of the execution of this subcontract If the Subcontractor refuses or faus to perform this deamng as directed by
the Contractor the Contractor ahall have the ri*ht and power to proceed with the said cleaning, and the Subcontractor will
en demand r * W to the Contractor the actual cost of aaid labor plus a reasonable percentage of such cost to cover supervision, insurance, overhead, e t c
The Subcontractor agrees to reimburse the Contractor for any and all Kquidated damages that may be assessed against
and collected from the Contractor by the Owner, which are attributable to or caused by the Subcontractor's failure to
furnish the materials and perform the work required by this Subcontract within the time fixed in the manner provided for
herein and in addition thereto, agrees to pay to the Contractor such other or additional damages as the Contractor may
sustain by reason of such delay by the Subcontractor. The payment of such damages shall not release the Subcontractor
from bis obligation to otherwise fully perform this Subcontract.
Whenever It may be useful or necessary to the Contractor to do so, the Contractor shall be permitted to occupy and/or
sise anv portion of the work which has been cither partially or fuUy completed by the Subcontractor before final inspection
and acceptance thereof by the Owner, but such tise and/or occupation shall not relieve the Subcontractor of his guarantee of
aaid work and materials nor of his obligation to make good at his own expense any defect in materials and workmanship which
tnav occur or develop prior to Contractor's release from responsibility to the Owner. Provided, howeveir the Subcontractor
shall not be responsible for the maintenance of such portion of the work as may be used and/or occupied by the Contractor,
nor for any damage thereto thai is due to or caused by the sole negligence of the Contractor during such penodof use.
Subcontractor shall be responsible for his own work, property and/or materials until completer> and final accepUnce of
the Contact by the Owner, and shall bear the risk of any loss or damage until such accepUnce and shall pay promptly lor
all materials and labor furnished to ihe project. In the event of ioss or damage, be shall proceed promptly to make repairs, or
replacement of the damaged work, property and/or materials at bis own expense, as directed by the Contractor. Subcontractor waives all rights Subcontractor might have against Owner and Contractor for loss or damage to Subcontractor s work,
property or materials.
It is agreed that the Subcontractor, at the option of the Contractor, may be considered as disabled from so complying
whenever a petition in Bankruptcy or for the appointment of a Receiver is filed against him.
The Subcontractor assumes toward the Contractor all the obligations tnd responsibilities that the Contractor assumes
toward the Owner The Subcontractor shalJ indemnify the Contractor and the Owner against.and uve them harmless from,
any and all loss, damage, expenses, costs, and attorneys' fees incurred or suffered on account of any breach of the provisions
or covenants of this contract.
Subcontractor trees to fully comply with the Occupational Safety I Health Act of 1970 and any and all regulations
*uJ^T£*T$ubconU*ll«
as a term and condition of this subcontract shall keep and save the contractor harmless
iwT.nv^H ^ o c h a l s of any kind by reason of subcontractor failing to fc.1l> comply with the act and regulations and
a r e ^ t o r e t W £ contractor for any fines, d a m a g e or expense.- of any kind incurred by the contractor by reason of
lh< subcontractor's failure to comply.
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4.

PERMITS. LICENSES, FEES, TAXES, ETC.

The Subcontractor shall, at hi* own co£t and expense, apply for and obtain til necessary permits and licenses and shall
.conform strictly lo the laws and ordinances in force in the locality where the work under the project is being done, insofar
as applicable to work covered by this agreement. The Subcontractor shall hold harmless the prime Contractor against liabilily
by rc^on of the Subcontractor having failed to pay federal, state, county or municipal taxes.

5. *m&mmo&The Subcontractor agrees to provide and maintain workmen's compensation insurance and to comply in alj respecU
with the employment and payment of labor, required by any constituted authority having legal jurisdiction over the area in
which the work is performed
The Subcontractor agrees to cany comprehensive public liability and property damage insurance, and such other
insurance as the Contractor might deem necessary, in amounts as approved by the Contractor, in order to protect the Contractor *nd Subcontractor against loss resulting from any acts of the Subcontractor, his agents, and/or employees. Such
insurance shall not be less than limits and coverages required in the fenerai contract documents.
The Subcontractor agTecs to furnish evidence satisfactory to the Contractor, of such insurance, including copies of the
policies, when requested to do so by the Contractor.
All insurance required hereunder shall be maintained in full force and effect in a company or companies satisfactory
to Contractor, shall be maintained at Subcontractor's expense until performance in full hereof (certificates of such insurance
being supplied by Subcontractor to Contractor), and such insurance shall be subject to requirement that Contractor muit be
notified by ten (10) d*ytf written notice before cancellation of any such policy. In event of threatened cancellation for nonpayment of premium, Contractor may pay aame for Subcontractor and deduct the said payment from amounts then or subsequently owing to Subcontractor hereunder.

6.

CHANGES, ADDITIONS AND DEDUCTIONS

The Contractor may add to or deduct from the amount of work covered by this agreement, and any changes made in
the amount of work involved, or any other parts of this agreement, shall be by a written amendment hereto setting forth in
detail the changes involved and the value thereof which shall be mutually agreed upon between the Contractor and the Subcontractor if such be possible; and iS such mutual agreement is not possible, then the T&lue of the work shall be determined as
prorided in Section 7 of this agreement. -In either event, however, the Subcontractor agrees lo proceed with the vsorl. as
changed when so ordered in writing by the Contractor so as not to delay the piogrcu of the work, and pending any determination of the value thereof.
The Subcontractor agrees to make no claim for additional work outside the scope of this contract unless terms hereof
shall be conclusive with respect of this agreement between the parties hereto. Claims for any extras shall be made within one
"week from date of completion.
The Subcontractor zhzl) net sublet, trtrxfer or assign this agreement cr any Inzds due Or to become due or any part
thereof without the written consent of the Contractor.

7.

DISPUTES

In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute
shall be settled in the manner provided by the contract documents. If none be provided, or if there arises any dispute concerning matters in connection with this agreement, and without the scope of the work, then such depute* shall be settled by
a ruling of a board of arbiirstion consisting of three members, one selected by the Contractor, one by the Subcontractor and
the third member shall be selected by the first two members. The Contractor and Subcontractor shall bear the expense of
their selected members respectively, but the expenses of the third member shall be borne by the party hereto requesting the
arbitration in writing.
The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by the findings of any *uch boards of arbitration, finally and
without recourse to any court of la*.
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in xnonthJy paymenti of
±£
*> of the work performed in auy preceding BQODLD, ID accordance with estimate*
prepared by the Subcontractor and a* approTed by the Contractor • nrf
Architect/Owner
J
; tuch payments Yo be made ax payments are received by the Contractor from the Owner
covering the monthly extimite* of tht Contractor, Including the approved portion of the Subcontractor*! monthly cstimat
In the rrenl the Subcontractor doet not submit to the Contractor *uch monthly estimate* prior to the date of lubmiiaion of the Contractor* monthly estimate, then the Contractor thalJ include in bii monthly estimate to the Owner for work
performed during the preceding month atjcb amount ax he ahaU deem proper for the work of the Subcontractor for the preceding month and the Subcontractor agree* to accept aucu approved portion thereof ax his regular monthly payment as
described above.
The Subcontractor agrees to make food without cost t o th* Owner or Contractor any and all defect* due to faulty
workmanship and/or materials which may appear within the period so established in the contract documents; and if no tuch
period be stipulated in the contract documents, then auch guarantee shall be for a period of one year from date of completion
of the project. The Subcontractor further Agrees t o execute any apecial guarantees ax provided by terms of the Contract
documents, prior to final payment.
In the event ft appears to the Contractor that the labor, material and other bills incurred in the performance of the
work art cot being currently paid, the Contractor may take such ateps as It deems necessary to assure absolutely that the
fnoney paid with any progress payment will be utilized to the full extent necessary to pay labor, material and all other bills

incurred in the performance of the work of Subcontractor. The Contractor may deduct from any amount* due or to become
due to the Subcontractor any aum or aums crvring by the Subcontractor to the Contractor; and in the event of any breach by
the Subcontractor of any provision or obligation of this Subcontract, or in the event of the assertion by other parties of any
clnitti 49T Urn ftgninct ll»f Contractor or Contractor'* Surety o r the premltci nrUinp out of the Subcontractor'* performance o f

this Contract, the Contractor aball have the right, but is not required, to retain out of amy payments due or to become due to
the Subcontractor an amount sufficient to completely protect the Contractor from any and all loss, damage or expense therefrom, tmtn the situation has been remedied or adjusted by the Subcontractor to the satisfaction of the Contractor. These
provisions shall be applicable even though the subcontractor has posted a full payment and performance bond.

9.

TERMINATION OF CONTRACT

In tht event the prime contract between the Owner and the Contractor ahould be terminated prior to its completion,
then the Contractor and Sdbcontractor agree that an equitable settlement for work performed under tht* agreement prior to
avudi termination, wHJ be made a* provided by the contract documents, if auch provision be made; or, if none sveh exist, next
by mutual agreement; or, tailing either of these methods, by arbitration as provided in Section 7.

10. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
During the performance of (hU subcontract, the Subcontractor agrees to no( discriminate agninsl tny employee bcoiu.se
of race, color, creed or national origin. As outlined in the Equal Opportunity Clause of the Regulations of Executive Order
10925 of March 6,1961 as amended by Executive Order 11246 of September 24,1965. The executive orders and the respective regulations art made a part of this subcontract by reference.

11. TERMS OF LABOR AGREEMENTS
It is hereby understood and agreed that for the work covered by this subcontract, the Subcontractor is bound and
-will comply with the terms and conditions of the labor agreements to which the general contractor h t party. Insofar as aaid
labor agreements lawfully require subcontractors td^be so bound.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Contractor and Subcontractor signify their understanding and agreement with the terms
hereof by affixing their signatures hereunto.
WITNESS:

Clark Mechanical Contractors/ I n c .

7 1 7 Columbia L a n e
<A<jdreto
P r o v o , Utah

^
Stephen l). ciarx

84604
J.B. Sheet Metal/ I n c .
<SubconliACtor)

2487 South 3270 West
(Addicu)

»„^?..<»0PD,,
/

A ^ ,

,"£zL

'

W e s t Valley C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 9
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Clark Mechonlca! Contractors. Inc.

This statement Is attached and made a part of the Clark Kechanical Contractors/ Inc. Subcontract Agreement:
(32) The federally assisted construction contractor certifies that he does
r ot maintain or provide for h i s employees any segregated f a c i l i t i e s a t any
of Ms establishments, and that he does not permit his employees to perforc
their cervices et any location, under his control, v-here segregated f a c i l i t i e s
ere eaintained. The federally assisted construction contractor c e r t i f i e s
further that he will not maintain or provide for his employees any segregated
facilities at any of his establishments, end thai he v i l l not permit h i s
employees to perform their services et any location, under his control, where
segregated'facilities ere maintained. The federally assisted construction
contractor agrees that a breach of this certification i s a violation of the
Equal Opportunity clause i n this contract. As used in this c e r t i f i c a t i o n ,
the term "segregated f a c i l i t i e s " means any waiting rooms, work ereas, r e s t
rooms end wash rooms, restaurants and other eating ereas. time clocks, locker
rooos and other storage or dressing areas, parking lots, drinking fountains,
recreation or entertainment areas, transportation, and-housing f a c i l i t i e s provided for employees which ere segregated by explicit directive or ere "in f a c t
segregated on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin, because of
habit, local custom, or other reason. The federally assisted construction
contractor agrees that (except where he has obtained identical c e r t i f i c a t i o n s
froa proposed contractors for specific time periods) he-vill obtain i d e n t i c a l
certifications from proposed subcontractors prior to the award of subcontracts _
exceeding $10,000 which ere not exempt from the provisions of the Equal Opportune
clause, end that he will retain such certifications in his f i l e s .

$-23-^0
Signa

Date

Stephen D. Clark President
Name and Title of Signer (Please type)

NDTE: The penalty for making f a l s e statements in offers i s prescribed
in 18 V. S. C. 1001

/no^iS
nvTTTnTm

To be added to Parag* 10 "Equal Employment G; -ortunity*

Clark Mechanical Contractors^ Inc. is a non-exempt federal contractor
and is subject to the following regulations: 41 CFR 60-1.4 (a) (7)/
41 CFR 60-250.4 (m),( and 41 CFR 60-741.4(f).
Statement of Certification on Nonsegregated Facilities (See Attachment.;
Also a part of this subcontract.
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